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Situation Report 5 July, 2024: Aftermath of Anti-Syrian Turkish Protests and Syrian-Turkish Normalisation

Key Takeaways:


· Although anti-Syrian protests in Turkey have subsided, domestic pressure remains high on President Erdogan to find a long-term solution to deal with the Syrian refugees residing in Turkey.

 

· Efforts to normalise Turkish-Syrian relations have been ongoing since December 2022, with President Erdogan eying normalisation as a potential solution to repatriating Syrian refugees; however, negotiations are challenging.

 

· KSG assesses that despite the potential for Syrian-Turkish normalisation to ease the migration flow from Syria to Turkey and the European Union (EU), normalisation is highly unlikely to resolve the underlying driving forces of migration from Syria.

 

· Moreover, if the Syrian-Turkish normalisation agreement includes provisions for the repatriation of Syrian refugees from Turkey, it may push a significant number of Syrian refugees to attempt migration from Turkey to EU countries to avoid repatriation.




Although violent anti-Syrian protests in Turkey have subsided, the incident has raised many questions about the future of the 3.6 million Syrian refugees currently residing in Turkey.

 

President Erdogan faces mounting domestic and political pressure to repatriate Syrian refugees in response to rising anti-refugee sentiment in Turkey. Many Turkish citizens feel that resources allocated to refugees could be better spent addressing socioeconomic challenges faced by Turkish citizens and that the presence of such a substantial number of Syrian refugees is taking a toll on social cohesion. This explains President Erdogan's willingness to restore diplomatic ties with Syria (severed in 2012) as a normalisation agreement would create the legal framework for returning refugees.

 

Thus far, talks between Turkey and Syria on the potential normalisation of relations have seen limited progress. Since December 2022, Turkey and Syria have engaged in talks mediated by Russia (with Iraqi involvement) to address regional security issues. However, fundamental differences in negotiating positions have impeded progress. The Syrian government has demanded Turkey withdraw its military presence in Syria as a precondition for any substantial progress. Meanwhile, Turkish preconditions for military withdrawal include constitutional amendments and democratic elections in Syria to ensure a stable and inclusive government.


Looking Forward

 

  • Given this, KSG considers negotiations unlikely to lead to normalisation within the next two years. Despite the unlikelihood of a ‘full normalisation’, a repatriation arrangement could perhaps be brokered. However, KSG assesses that a normalisation agreement and repatriation framework:

 

  • Is unlikely to reduce the overall flow of Syrian refugees, as a repatriation agreement is likely to push a significant number of Syrian refugees residing in Turkey to attempt migration to EU countries, given the poor economic situation in Syria. The Syrian economy has seen limited progress in reconstruction following the peaks of the (ongoing) Civil War and the 2023 earthquake, in addition to distrust of the Assad regime among many Syrians.

 

  • Creates a limited (yet still significant) chance that the EU would reduce (or cease) funding for Turkey's refugee response; such a scenario would likely remove Turkey's incentive to continue preventing Turkish-based refugees from crossing into EU countries, thereby exacerbating the potential increase in the flow of Syrian (and other) refugees into EU countries through Turkey, out of a fear of repatriation.

 

 By Jake Glasmacher, Middle East Analyst


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