Key Takeaways:
Following the latest US ceasefire proposal made on 16 August, 2024, negotiations have not significantly progressed. Although US government officials have pressed Israel and Hamas to reach an agreement, they have been unsuccessful thus far.
KSG assesses that the ongoing talks in Cairo are likely to encounter similar difficulties as previous negotiation attempts. KSG thus expects the negotiations status quo to persist.
Tensions in the Middle East remain high. Unsuccessful negotiations are likely to increase the risk of an Iranian strike against Israel.
The United States’ inability to broker a ceasefire raises concerns about its influence in the Middle East, potentially weakening its political effectiveness in other regions – namely, the South China Sea and NATO’s Eastern Flank.
Background:
On 16 August, the US and its allies presented what they hope to be a final version of a ceasefire plan – a “bridging proposal” meant to reconcile the positions of Israel and Hamas. Recent diplomatic efforts by US officials have attempted to corral Israeli and Hamas officials and negotiators into agreeing on this latest version of the original ceasefire plan which was announced by President Biden in May.
During his trip from 17 to 21 August, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken spoke with leaders in Egypt and Qatar about the latest proposal. This is his ninth visit to the region since the start of the war. It is highly likely that during the trip, Blinken’s goal was to get Hamas to agree to the bridging proposal presented by the US, and, according to Blinken, agreed to by Israel earlier that week; details of this proposal are not public. Despite some loose agreement between Israel and Hamas on Biden’s original three-phase ceasefire proposal, negotiations have not advanced. Israeli negotiators are also upset with Blinken for his statements about how the US and Israel see “eye-to-eye on aspects of the proposal”, claiming his stance makes it harder to secure agreements from Hamas. KSG analysis and interviews demonstrated no evidence that Blinken’s efforts to formalize an agreement have been successful.
Changes in negotiating stances also appear to be frustrating efforts to achieve a deal. For instance, Israel has neither confirmed nor denied that it has agreed to the bridging proposal. The Financial Times reports that a diplomat has indicated the bridging proposal includes a reduction in Israel’s presence in the Philadelphi Corridor, while Netanyahu spoke recently saying he would not withdraw troops there. Hamas has refused to attend ongoing negotiations in Cairo, as they say they have already agreed to a deal on 2 July and do not wish to consider amendments made by Netanyahu.
In a call on 21 August, President Biden and Prime Minister Netanyahu discussed the most recent round of negotiations taking place in Cairo. This latest negotiating session is likely to focus on security disagreements between Israel, Hamas, and Egypt on the Philadelphi Corridor, and on the release of the remaining Israeli hostages held in Gaza.
These latest rounds of talks and Blinken’s travels across the Middle East accompany a high point in regional tensions. Reciprocal strikes between Israel and Hezbollah continue, threatening escalation into war if the situation is not carefully managed by both sides. The recent assassination of senior Hamas and Hezbollah leaders has ratcheted up tensions between Israel and Iran. Iran has not yet reciprocated, as they are likely to be refraining from attacking “until ceasefire talks conclude”.
Looking Forward:
1. KSG assesses that the impasse in negotiations is unlikely to change in the next 6 months. Thus, the United States’ political and military involvement in the region is likely to remain consistent or increase if regional tensions escalate or result in another war. Subsequently, conversations in the US regarding funding for Israel may increase in the coming month.
2. If negotiations fail and there is a prolonged pause before a renewal, KSG assesses that Iran is likely to take the opportunity to strike against Israel. However, Iran will likely avoid significantly escalating tension, opting for a limited strike that does not oblige Israel to reciprocate. An attack from Iran is likely to imperil oil and gas prices, and potentially threaten energy infrastructure itself within Israel.
3. Finally, KSG assesses the US’ inability to facilitate a ceasefire raises questions about its capacity to affect change in the Middle East and beyond. Despite the United States’ immense military power and diplomatic presence in the Middle East, it has largely been unsuccessful in preventing low-level threats to global shipping in the Red Sea, and cross-border strikes between Israel and Hezbollah. Consequently, if a regional conflict occurs, or if negotiations break down significantly, KSG assesses that the United States may be perceived to be ineffectual at fostering political settlements in conflict zones. This perception would likely have negative implications for US deterrence operations vis-a-vs China, Russia and Iran, as these revisionist powers continue to see the hegemony of the US reduce.