Note: This situation report acts as KSG's routine monthly update on these inextricable conflicts. The last public release in the series was on 22 October, 2024 (assessment link). The full series is reserved for our members.
Key Takeaways:
The US-brokered Israel-Hizbullah ceasefire faces challenges with ongoing retaliation. Israel is expected to maintain a southern Lebanon security presence while transitioning operations to the Lebanese Armed Forces.
Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) ousted former President Bashar al-Assad. A transitional government led by Mohammed al-Bashir is in place, as Russia withdraws and Türkiye expands its influence in Syria.
The US continues to collaborate with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) against ISIS, causing friction with Türkiye. The Trump administration will likely prioritize support for Israel, although Saudi-Israeli normalization remains unlikely.
KSG assesses that Russo-Turkish tensions over Syria may disrupt energy flows, highlighting the Southern Gas Corridor's importance. KSG also assesses investment opportunities for firms in Saudi green initiatives and Türkiye's defense sector.
Hizbullah Ceasefire
The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have continued their campaign to exterminate Hizbullah’s capabilities and infrastructure, especially in southern Lebanon. Despite initial violations by Israel and Hizbullah of the US brokered ceasefire (agreed 26th November), no significant violations have been noted since early December. The IDF is also tapering off operations and phasing in troops from the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in accordance with the ceasefire agreement, but will likely sustain a security presence in southern Lebanon to ensure that Hizbullah remains incapacitated.
KSG assessment concluded that the fall of the Assad regime in Syria has severely diminished Hizbullah’s supply line of Iranian weapons and equipment, further undermining Hizbullah’s capabilities.
Syria
Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a coalition of Sunni militias stemming from al-Qaeda and led by Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, toppled Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s government after a lightning offensive that captured Aleppo and Damascus by December 8th. Türkiye played a major role, backing the Syrian National Army (SNA) that aided HTS’s campaign and maintaining links to HTS. HTS has appointed Mohammed al-Bashir, former leader of its northwest territory, as head of a transitional government until at least March 2025.
The unseating of Assad and the new Damascus government have been met with cautious optimism. G7 nations have urged adherence to Syrian territorial integrity and human rights, while Western and regional countries have engaged with the interim government to help stabilise Syria. Jordan and Iraq have begun returning Syrian refugees and soldiers, a trend likely to expand globally with peace.
KSG intelligence collection and assessment drew the following conclusions on international perceptions of the situation:
1 - Russia
Assad’s defeat has tarnished Russian prestige and undermines its narrative of being a reliable partner, placing its African interests, as well as its Syrian military bases in a precarious position. Assad has taken asylum in Russia.
Moscow is attempting to retain control of its Syrian bases whilst having negotiated an orderly withdrawal of personnel and assets with the new leadership in Damascus. The Khmeimim airbase in Latakia is crucial for Russia’s logistics between its mainland and Africa, but its status under Syria’s new regime is currently being negotiated alongside Tartus.
2 - China
Despite China’s ties to the Assad regime, Beijing is likely to normalize relations with the new Syrian government and invest in rebuilding Syrian infrastructure. China will likely push for the exclusion of Uyghur militants in exchange for normalized economic relations with Syria. China had connections to the Assad regime and has made some investments in Syria throughout the past 20 years, with Syria even joining the Belt and Road Initiative in 2023 (although no investments were made under the initiative). HTS and Damascus will likely be keen to maintain good relations with Beijing, likely aided by Türkiye, in order to secure funding to help rebuild Syrian infrastructure after years of war.
3 - United States
The US has used the situation to degrade ISIS’s capabilities within Syria, as US Central Command (CENTCOM) struck over 75 targets on December 8th. Representatives of the Biden administration and interim Syrian government met in Damascus on December 20th, resulting in the removal of the $10 million USD bounty on al-Jolani. The US continues to partner with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces to counter ISIS activity, despite opposition from the SNA.
4 - Israel
Israel’s invasion of the demilitarized zone outside the Golan Heights has drawn criticism from Russia and France, who have urged Israel to respect Syrian sovereignty and allow the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) forces to operate.
5 - Iran
The fall of Assad has tilted the Middle Eastern balance of power towards Israel, likely undermining Iranian domestic stability, and forcing it to recalibrate its current strategy. The loss of the Assad regime as a regional ally alongside the degradation of Hizbullah leaves Tehran with Iraqi militias and the Houthis in Yemen as its only remaining proxies.
6 - Türkiye
Türkiye’s deep involvement in Syria positions it as the primary regional actor, whether in reconstruction or renewed conflict. Regime change in Damascus has boosted Türkiye’s regional standing, as it consistently backed Syrian opposition forces even as Western support waned.
Situation in Gaza
Israel continues operations in Gaza conducting operations, bombing Rafah and other areas deemed strategic to Hamas’s operations. Hamas remains resilient despite Israeli efforts and losses in its leadership structure.
KSG continues to assess that International Criminal Court (ICC) warrants for Netanyahu and former Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant will remain largely inconsequential.
Ceasefire talks have continued between Egyptian, Qatari, American, Israel and Hamas representatives, with optimism peaking due to reported new desires by Hamas to reach a deal before 2025 begins. However, Israeli demands to retain troop presence in the Netzarim and Philadelphi Corridor have continued to delay consensus agreement. KSG assesses that a ceasefire is not likely within the first 6 months of 2025, and that the optimism is unfounded.
Forward Look:
Israel, Hizbullah and Lebanon
KSG assesses that the ceasefire is likely to be honored by Hizbullah. With its leadership decimated by Israel, Hizbullah will likely focus on consolidating power in Lebanon to counter emerging competition for central authority. Compounded by the loss of Hizbullah’s Iranian weapons supply line through Syria, Hizbullah will likely pose little threat to Israel in 2025.
KSG assesses that the ceasefire is likely to be honored by Israel given the lack of threat from Hizbullah. However, Netanyahu’s government will likely pursue a policy of relentlessly guaranteeing Israeli security, breaking it if they feel sufficiently threatened.
Israel and Gaza
KSG assesses that a meaningful ceasefire between Israel and Hamas is unlikely until Hamas’s capabilities have been completely eradicated in the Gaza Strip. Israel’s US backing will likely make it difficult for any actor to pressure Israel into withdrawing from Gaza, although Jerusalem will have to contend with its population’s own conflict fatigue in 2025 as domestic pressure grows to ensure Israeli security and stability.
Syria
KSG assesses that HTS and its government in Damascus will likely remain the central authority in Syria for the next twelve months minimum. However, Syrian security will likely be marred by clashes between the SDF and the SNA. KSG assesses that HTS will attempt to stay out of the conflict in order to facilitate the removal of its designation as a terrorist group, but will struggle not to capitulate to Turkish influence.
KSG assesses that Türkiye’s actions against the Kurdish-led SDF in Syria will incite attacks by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in Türkiye, especially in the eastern region due to its higher concentration of Kurdish peoples. KSG assesses that this could present significant risk to the ‘Middle’ or Trans-Caspian Route, endangering Eurasian supply chains. Ankara will likely also be at risk, with PKK action against the government likely to endanger investments into the Turkish capital.
Russia
KSG assesses that Russia will likely lose access to its critical Syrian naval base, Tartus, in the next two years. This loss will cause Moscow to ramp up support for Saddam Haftar and the Libyan National Army in hopes of securing access to the eastern port of Benghazi in Libya to ensure stable Russian access to a warm water port and the Mediterranean. KSG assesses that this will further destabilize Libyan oil production, harming European, especially Italian energy security.
KSG collection concluded that a crucial Russian objective here is to create a consistent strategic dilemma to NATO’s southern flank, thus maintaining the ability to influence NATO’s position in the Ukraine conflict.
Iran
KSG assesses that Hizbullah’s decimation will force Iran to recalibrate and prop up the Houthis in Yemen.
KSG collection concluded that Tehran now sees the Houthis as its most effective proxy to threaten Israel, an unthinkable negative concept before the October 7th attacks. This new strategic reality for Iran demonstrates the effectiveness to date of Israel’s military, intelligence and diplomatic responses to the initial attack.
The Suez Canal route will likely remain unsafe for Western ships throughout 2025.
Türkiye
Türkiye will likely look to solidify its presence as a major player in the global defence sector following its role in the collapse of the Assad regime. KSG assesses opportunities for firms like Baykar Technology, due to the company’s advanced drone capabilities and MKE (The Mechanical and Chemical Industry), a Turkish state-owned defence company, due to its prowess in munitions production.
US Implications
KSG assesses that US presence in Syria will be defined by continued CENTCOM airstrikes to ensure that ISIS cannot regain or expand its territorial holdings within Syria. Therefore, defence manufacturers like Boeing and Lockheed Martin will see steady demand for munitions such as Lockheed’s Hellfire Missiles and Boeing’s Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs).
KSG assesses that under President Trump, the US will not participate in Syrian state-building, given the perception that such an approach has not been successful in the past.
The US-Türkiye alliance is highly likely to be strained by confrontation between the SDF and the SNA, and could likely result in the US weaponizing its natural gas exports to Türkiye. KSG assesses that this friction will likely lead Ankara to rely more heavily on Egypt and Algeria for natural gas.
Energy
KSG assesses that Syria (alongside competition for influence on the African continent) could become a flashpoint in Russo-Turkish tensions due to Russia’s support for the previous Assad regime and Türkiye’s backing of the new Syrian government.
This may threaten TurkStream gas flows, jeopardizing energy security for nations like Hungary and Bulgaria, already facing the end of the Ukraine-Russia gas transit agreement in December 2024. The growing risks make the Southern Gas Corridor from Azerbaijan vital for Central and Eastern Europe. KSG assesses that the British firm BP likely stands to benefit from its stake in Azerbaijani gas as the Southern Gas Corridor becomes critical to European energy security.