Note: KSG previously released two public assessments on this topic:
More regular reporting was reserved for ‘Continuous Global Intelligence Assessment’ clients.
Key Takeaways:
Maduro’s inauguration is set against a backdrop of political unrest, with intensified crackdowns on opposition figures. This is likely to provoke further demonstrations, escalate violence, and worsen the migration crisis in the region.
Maduro's continued presidency faces growing diplomatic opposition, with:
Regional powers like Argentina rejecting the election results.
Sanctions from the EU, US, UK, and Canada likely to intensify.
KSG assesses that Maduro may escalate the territorial dispute over the Essequibo region to rally domestic support, potentially increasing military activity near the border. This could strain relations with Guyana and invite greater US involvement in defending Guyanese sovereignty.
Maduro’s regime is expected to face heightened sanctions, potentially targeting Venezuela's oil sector, which could significantly cut revenues and deepen economic dependence on Russia and China.
If González were to assume power (low likelihood), he is likely to open Venezuelan oil reserves to Western markets, focusing on economic reforms and restoring international relations.
Overview
Nicolás Maduro has been inaugurated as the President of Venezuela. This comes after Edmundo González, widely believed to be the rightful winner of the July 28th elections, returned to the region with the aim of assuming the presidency on 10th January.
It is highly likely that González would need significant military backing, through either a coup or high-level defections, to assume the presidency in Venezuela.
Possible Scenarios
KSG intelligence assessments produced two scenarios of varying likelihood:
Scenario 1: Nicolás Maduro retains the presidency throughout 2025, intensifying repression against opposition figures. Over the course of a year, the situation is likely to stabilise to a degree, albeit under heavy sanctions, and an increasingly authoritarian regime (high likelihood).
Scenario 2: Edmundo González gains the presidency through a military coup, or the coordinated defection of high-ranking officers. If possible at all, this would need to occur within the next three months (low likelihood).
Although KSG assesses a low likelihood of Scenario 2, it was examined given KSG clients’ interest in political and economic outcomes should González successfully oust Maduro from power.
Regional Responses and Implications
In order to garner international support for his presidency, González began a regional tour in the days leading up to 10th January. Visiting Uruguay, Argentina, the US, Panama and the Dominican Republic, González spoke to current presidents, who publicly reiterated their support for him as rightful president-elect.
Colombia released a statement rejecting the results of the Venezuelan election.
Brazil’s foreign ministry also denounced the Maduro regime. Relations between Brazil and Venezuela remain strained after Brazil blocked Venezuela’s entry into BRICS, which Caracas labelled as an ‘inexplicable aggression’.
Despite strained relations, ambassadors from Colombia, Brazil, and Mexico attended the inauguration, although the only Latin American presidents to attend were those of Nicaragua and Cuba.
The US Position
As part of his regional tour, González travelled to Washington on 6th January to meet with Joe Biden, who ‘reiterated his conviction for a peaceful transition in Venezuela’. The leader of the opposition also met with Mike Waltz, who underlined that he would be monitoring events in Venezuela. Whilst González did not meet president-elect Donald Trump during his visit, Trump publicly declared his support for González and Machado in a post on Truth Social.
Following González’s meeting with Joe Biden, the Venezuelan government released a statement rejecting the ‘imperialist interventionism’ of the US. Consequently, after the inauguration, the US increased the reward for any information leading to the arrest of Maduro to $25 million USD and escalated sanctions to put further pressure on the current regime.
International Positions
Following the release of KSG’s last public report, the European Union, UK, US, and Canada have all condemned the Maduro regime and increased sanctions following the inauguration.
Venezuelan allies Russia, China, and India all sent official delegations to the inauguration. They attended alongside the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Secretary General. Russian partnerships with Venezuela have increased, with several Memorandum of Understandings (MoU) surrounding energy, IT, and the car industry signed between Russia and state oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA).
Domestic Implications
On 2nd January, the Venezuelan national police service announced a $100,000 USD reward for any information leading to the discovery of González’s whereabouts. Following this, González’s son-in-law was reportedly abducted, and opposition leader Maria Corina Machado was briefly detained.
Nationwide demonstrations on January 9th highlighted the growing unrest, with Maduro responding with tighter border controls, including a 72-hour closure of the Colombia-Venezuela border.
As a result, despite plans to return to the country, González has not yet reentered Venezuela, although in a statement on X he said he ‘continues to work on returning’ to assume the presidency.
Forward Look
Scenario 1:
Security Implications
KSG assesses that Maduro is likely to tighten border controls to prevent González’s return, coupled with intensified repression of opposition figures. Increased repression is highly likely to provoke larger-scale demonstrations, leading to violence.
KSG assesses that González will likely be arrested by security forces upon arrival in the country. It is likely that González’s arrest would provoke larger-scale demonstrations, leading to further civil unrest and an increase in government repression and violence.
Increased violence and repression would be extremely likely to exacerbate the ongoing migration crisis. (As outlined in KSG’s previous situation report on 10th September). It is especially likely to affect Colombia’s border region, migration in the Darien Gap and Central America, potentially causing an influx of migrants to Mexico and across the US border.
Amidst internal unrest, Maduro is likely to increase military presence near the disputed Essequibo region as a show of strength. Such moves could heighten tensions between Venezuela and Guyana, leading to confrontations along the border. Consequently, Guyana is likely to bolster its own defense capabilities in response, potentially with assistance from allies like the United States, which has shown interest in supporting Guyana’s sovereignty, thus escalating US-Venezuela tensions further.
Economic Implications
Venezuela will likely face increased economic sanctions from the EU, US, UK and Canada. It is highly likely that increased repression will lead the incoming Trump administration to revoke oil licences for oil companies operating in Venezuela, in a repeat of his first-term strategy. This is likely to reduce Venezuelan oil production and could create supply gaps for heavy crude based refineries, such as those on the US Gulf Coast, particularly if other heavy crude producers cannot quickly increase output. This is likely to reinforce the reliance on other suppliers, thus causing a rise in global oil prices due to reduced flexibility in supply.
The reinstatement of more stringent sanctions is likely to significantly cut Venezuela’s oil revenue, leading to increased reliance on traditional allies such as Russia and China. Considering recent MoUs with Russia and PDVSA, Venezuela is expected to heavily rely on Chinese and Russian aid to circumvent economic pressure caused by sanctions on both nations.
Russian oil companies are likely to continue playing a pivotal role in purchasing and marketing Venezuelan crude oil, using shadow fleets and intermediaries to bypass Western sanctions. This is likely to make Venezuela more vulnerable to changes in the Russia-Ukraine war.
Diplomatic Implications
KSG assesses that regional isolation is extremely likely to worsen. González is likely to continue to leverage support from North and South American allies to put diplomatic pressure on Maduro, and persuade the armed forces to back him should he attempt to re-enter Venezuela. This will exacerbate current tensions between the West and Venezuela.
Scenario 2:
Security Implications
KSG assesses that a direct coup, led by senior military figures, would be the most likely scenario to force Maduro from power and install González as president. Whilst key generals and commanders may defect to González’s side in exchange for promises of amnesty, future leadership roles, or protection of their assets, it is likely that the military would fracture into competing factions. This is highly likely to result in several months of domestic instability, with mass civilian demonstrations and violent clashes with pro-Maduro armed colectivos.
KSG assesses that initial turmoil and subsequent stabilisation efforts could last for a period of six to twelve months, likely resulting in short-term chaos but long-term opportunities for recovery. Whilst international support, especially from regional allies such as the USA, is likely to aid Venezuela in transitioning towards democracy and economic prosperity, stability would depend heavily on González’s ability to consolidate power, unify the military, and implement reforms.
Economic Implications
It is extremely likely that a coup would disrupt oil production and exports in the first six months of transition, with global oil seeing price spikes due to disrupted Venezuelan supply. Over time, other oil producers could increase production to offset Venezuela’s losses. However, such adjustments are constrained by existing production agreements and capacity limitations, which is likely to push global markets toward higher baseline prices due to reduced flexibility in supply.
If González’s government stabilizes the country and attracts foreign investment, KSG assesses that it is highly likely that González would open up Venezuelan oil reserves to international markets, potentially increasing production significantly in the long term. This could include agreements to relax or lift sanctions, and diversifying energy partnerships through bringing in Western energy companies like ExxonMobil and Chevron.
Diplomatic Implications
González’s presidency would likely mark a swift effort to rebuild diplomatic and economic relations with Western nations. It is highly likely that he would re-engage with multilateral organisations such as the Organisation of American States (OAS) and improve relations with regional neighbours. This would significantly reduce Venezuela's reliance on Russia and China.
It is likely that González would adopt a diplomatic approach to the Essequibo dispute with Guyana, engaging in bilateral negotiations to avoid regional instability.
Most Likely Scenario in 6 Months (June 2025):
Nicolás Maduro will have retained the presidency in Venezuela, but will have increased repressive measures and tightened border controls.
This will have led to an increase in international pressure and sanctions, especially from the US, who will have removed oil licences for US companies operating in Venezuela.
Venezuela will have increasingly relied on Russian and Chinese support to circumvent these sanctions. Russian oil companies will have continued playing a pivotal role in purchasing and marketing Venezuelan crude oil, whereas China will have expanded its involvement in Venezuelan infrastructure projects, such as ports, telecommunications, and energy facilities.
Venezuela will have increased military presence near the disputed Essequibo region. In response, Guyana will have worked with the US to increase its own defense, heightening tensions in the region.